Judicial Independence in Hybrid Regimes: Perceptions from Within the Bench

Authors

    Mohammad Rezaei Department of Political Science, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
    Sara Daneshvar * Department of Department of Criminal Law and Criminology, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran Saradanesh7ar@yahoo.com

Keywords:

Judicial independence, hybrid regimes, political pressures, Iran, thematic analysis, judiciary reforms, career security, public awareness

Abstract

This study aims to explore the perceptions of judicial independence among judges in a hybrid political regime, focusing on their experiences in Iran, specifically in Qazvin, and examining the challenges they face in maintaining judicial autonomy amidst political pressures. This qualitative study involved semi-structured interviews with 17 judges from Qazvin, Iran. The participants were purposively selected to provide a diverse range of perspectives on judicial independence, representing different ranks and levels of experience within the judiciary. Data were collected through face-to-face interviews, each lasting between 60 and 90 minutes. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using NVivo software for thematic analysis. Theoretical saturation was reached during the data collection process. The study identified four key themes: the role of the judiciary, external and internal pressures, the impact of the hybrid political system, and strategies for strengthening judicial independence. Judges expressed a commitment to upholding the rule of law, but also acknowledged significant challenges due to political influence, career insecurity, and hierarchical pressures within the judiciary. The hybrid political system, characterized by both democratic and authoritarian elements, was found to create a complex environment for maintaining judicial autonomy. Judges proposed institutional reforms, capacity-building, and increased public awareness as strategies to protect judicial independence. The findings suggest that while judicial independence is valued by judges, it is severely constrained in hybrid regimes, where political interference and internal institutional dynamics pose significant barriers. The study underscores the need for structural reforms, career security, and public support to strengthen judicial independence in such political systems. Future research should explore comparative perspectives and the role of international support in promoting judicial autonomy in hybrid regimes.

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References

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Published

2023-01-01

Submitted

2022-11-14

Revised

2022-12-15

Accepted

2022-12-28

How to Cite

Rezaei, M., & Daneshvar, S. (2023). Judicial Independence in Hybrid Regimes: Perceptions from Within the Bench. Contemporary Issues in Law, Culture, and Globalization, 1(1), 1-11. https://journalcilcg.com/index.php/cilcg/article/view/1